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Abstract: 
 
This paper deals with market power and information issues in the ongoing process 
of the European Electricity Market.  We present a regulatory game played among the key 
group of utilities, the customers and the regulatory authority. The development of the game 
allows us to state for a clear commitment to entry freedom reducing the informational 
strategic advantage of incumbents. As the assumption of such a commitment involves another 
game, we develop it and we conclude that the liberalisation of entry is also a key factor for 
credibility and effectiveness of flexible regulation and tariffs reduction as well.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the first Electricity Liberalisation Directive (96/92/EC) a complex 
process towards the restructuring and deregulation of the electricity market was 
accomplished. Actually, market opening is slightly over 90%. EC Directives 
represented a successful, centralized approach to market liberalisation. 
Notwithstanding,  switching levels being still low in households and heavy 
losses suffered by new entrants – then leaving the market – seem to point to a 
situation of legal opening rather than a real opening. Except for UK and North Pool 
countries, this may apply to a significant share of the European electricity (and 
natural gas) market(s) (EC, 2011). 
Serious deficiencies in the competitive structure of current market can be 
easily identified. They are related to: insufficient unbundling, highly concentrated 
market structures, insufficient network connections and significant differences 
between network costs and wholesale prices. 
Natural gas market distortions remain crucial, as gas is a major fuel for 
electricity generation. Its non-competitive market structure and still poor regulation 
of transmission and storage affect both markets. 
The problem of concentration seems chronic. Furthermore, both the 
European Commission and national regulators are facing increasing difficulties to 
control mergers on each market and between companies with activities in both 
markets, which is particularly problematic for a fair competition. The state direct or 
indirect aid to “National Champions” is still another problem as it can help 
concentration. The electricity sector is moving into a period of major investments, 
thus state resources can have important foreclosure effects on competition (Lowe, 
2006). Furthermore, under a serious economic and budget crisis, some national 
governments as utilities shareholders, can have a strong influence on future market 
structure through the sale criteria (and final decision) of their corporate shares.  
Like other network industries (telecom, railways, aviation, postal services) 
electricity (and gas) have unique characteristics: significant economies of scale or 
scope (extending to natural monopolies); far-reaching externalities in production or 
consumption; and large vertical and horizontal integration. These features explain 
why the introduction of competitive mechanisms and the creation of open markets 
had equal impacts on both innovations and disruptions (Joskow and Schmalensee, 
1983; Baumol and Sidak ,1994). Furthermore, beyond being capital intensive, the 
European electricity industry presents two other characteristics: price elasticity of 
demand below 1 and severe storage constraints.  
In what concerns the game and the strategic variables the electricity 
generation market is very much like a Cournot market with capacity constraints 
(Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983) where the quantities correspond to the decision 
variable. Even when the price is assumed as a strategic variable, the results of the 
strategies are similar to the Cournot game due to capacity constraint.  
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Due to the nature of the electricity generation, the exercise of market power 
occurs almost naturally. 
In this paper we present a regulatory game played among the key group of 
electricity companies, the customers and the regulatory authority, discussing the 
strategic features under the process of taking liberalization measures to lower 
electricity prices or tariffs to end-users. The development of the game allows us to 
state for a clear commitment to entry freedom reducing the informational strategic 
advantage of incumbents. As the assumption of such a commitment involves another 
game, we develop it and we find that the sector opening to potential competitors and 
the liberalisation of entry are also a key factor for credibility and effectiveness of 
flexible regulation and tariffs reduction as well. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we propose a 
critical perspective of the outcome of 14 years of EU top-down liberalization 
strategy of the electricity sector. Section 3 proposes a regulation game played among 
a key group of electricity companies, the regulator and the customers. Our main goal 
is to analyse credible entry as a key factor for a successful liberalisation process. 
Section 4 presents our main conclusions and final remarks, concerning a flexible 
regulatory framework and the need to the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER) empowerment. Both of them appear as indispensable conditions 
to guarantee: credible freedom of market entrance, as a tool to make a correct 
scrutiny of mergers & acquisitions, and also of possible effects of cross-country 
ownership of vertically integrated companies.  
 
 
2.  From Economic Theory to Empirical Evidence 
 
Since the 19(90)’s the EU energy policy has introduced deep and extensive 
changes on electricity and natural gas markets that  have completely modify the old 
energy paradigm. Three Electricity Directives have been set: 1996, 2003 and 2009. 
As Pollitt (2009) refers, these Directives also had a significant impact on the energy 
policy of two European non-EU countries: Norway and Switzerland. The rationale 
behind the Directives was clear: wholesale and retail activities could be made 
competitive, thus the prices would be set by markets as the core assumption was that 
sectors which are run on competitive rules are more efficient than those run as 
monopolies. The final result should be lower prices to the final consumers. 
Transmission and distribution were natural monopolies and prices would be set by 
an independent Regulator. 
The liberalization process has been a dynamic task, involving complex 
problems: the enlargement of national to regional markets, the reduction of entry 
barriers to new competitors on generation and retail, the reforming of transmission 
and distribution regulation emphasizing investment incentives and considering 
scattered, intermittent renewable generation. Independent regulation also proved to 
be critical for the achievement of the reforms. Notwithstanding the broader scope of 
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the EU Directives, the unbundling issue stands as the core of the controversy about 
the best strategy to break down persistent barriers to cross-border trade, investment 
and competition (Buchan, 2007).  
There is a consensus over the key lessons learned from the liberalization of 
the European electricity market learned: 
 
 Vertical Integration remains a serious problem. 
 Collusion or gaming are relatively frequent due both to 
market structure and market design. 
 Entry barriers still exist, sometimes closely linked to 
effective “protectionism” from national governments. 
 Regulation is not always effective. 
 
Although the high number of companies in the market, six of them dominate 
the energy markets: Electricité de France (EdF), German E.ON, Italian Enel, 
Swedish Vattenfal, German RWE and Gaz de France Suez ( GdF). These companies 
have generation assets in several European countries and most of them have also 
some assets outside European borders. 
Empirical evidence also emphasized the economic characteristics of the 
electricity business: 
 
 Absolute cost advantage of established companies 
(techniques, know how, research) 
 Consumer loyalty 
 Capital requirements and funding constraints. 
 Economies of scale 
 Irreversible commitment 
 
Typical reasons for market power and market power strategies also proved 
to happen in the real world. Capacity withholding and strategic bidding are 
effectively typical market power strategies in the European electricity market. On 
the other hand, market power is the outcome of seven well known features of the 
electricity sector: transmission constraints and market fragmentation, high degree of 
concentration, inelastic demand, peak demand conditions and instantaneous 
balancing, strong national incumbents, joint capital control of generation and 
transmission capacities, gaps in market arrangements. 
Moreover, the organization of spot markets seems to matter! The 
controversy between the Uniform Pricing Auction (UPA) model and the Pay-As-Bid 
(PAB) model has not finished. In the UPA model, the generator that sells the 
marginal amount defines the system marginal price, while in the PAB the electricity 
sold by different generators is paid at the price of their bids. Neither auction model 
is inherently immune to the exercise of market power. Consequently, market 
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monitoring remains an important element of any market design regardless of the 
choice of auction model. Under a Pay-As-Bid auctions model there is an incentive 
for all suppliers to bid the expected market-clearing price, rather than submitting 
bids reflecting each facility’s individual marginal costs. Then, the variation in bid 
prices within any given period is substantially reduced by a Pay-As-Bid auction 
(Tierney et al, 2008). However, such wholesale market design would potentially 
reduce the effectiveness of such monitoring and mitigation efforts by creating 
barriers to the identification of potential manipulation and complicating alternatives 
for subsequent price mitigation. 
 
 
3.  Credible Entry in Regulation Games 
 
Let us consider the regulation game which is played among the key group of 
electricity enterprises, the public and the regulatory authorities (or government 
agencies). We are going to discuss the strategic features underlying the process of 
lowering electricity prices or tariffs to end users. In an efficiency framework this 
process implies a parallel adjustment and cost reduction in the supply chain of 
electricity in order to make compatible price reduction and profitability, investment 
and the quality and guarantee of services provided by electricity companies. 
Otherwise, the reaction from the public would force the government to change the 
policy guidelines and to stop reform and liberalization in electricity sectors.  
The success of a liberalisation program and the policy aimed to reduce 
prices or tariffs to end users of electricity depends upon the maintenance of the 
quality of services and the guarantee of supplies. The key sector of marginal or low 
profitability companies must adjust their costs and production levels to successfully 
face prices or tariffs reductions keeping enough quantity and quality in electricity 
supply services. This key or strategic group is made up by the segment of high costs 
and less efficient companies. This electricity enterprises segment will be 
denominated as the electricity strategic group (E). 
Actually, regulatory authorities (A) always face a serious information 
problem. Anti-competitive behaviour is extremely difficult to prove. In fact, there 
are plenty of reasons to restrain generation capacity which increase prices: power 
failure, risk of equipment damage, the end of the company emission quotas. 
However, the correct identification of such behaviour is also difficult 
because it demands the evaluation of the company price-cost margin. This implies 
the calculation of the marginal cost of production. International experience on this 
matter reinforces the idea that we are dealing with critical, often unavailable 
information. Why? Because, to get a reliable calculation, it is absolutely necessary 
to have, inter alia, a detailed level of knowledge and information: 
 
 To distinguish all the different kinds of power plants. 
 To evaluate all variable costs over the fuel cost 
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 To consider the opportunity cost of not producing on a 
certain moment, in order to produce later (option to 
postpone power generation). This can involve the 
postponing of water basin use or the saving emission 
rights. 
 
The Regulatory Authority (A) can never be 100% sure about all these key 
issues. They are also unable to foresee which feasible adjustments the electricity 
companies are going to do. Both Governments and Regulatory Authorities cannot 
rely on information coming from electricity companies for there is a conflict of 
interests and the later can benefit from their informational advantage. 
The different decision nodes and branches of the game tree modelling this 
conflict of interests are represented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Tariffs and adjustment in the electricity sector. 
 
 
 
The game starts with the decision by regulatory authorities to take measures 
to reduce electricity prices or tariffs to end users. The effectiveness of the measure 
depends upon avoiding undesirable effects in the amount and quality of the services 
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delivered to the public (P). This requires the effective adjustment of the electricity 
company strategic group (E). 
The trouble is that group E has no incentive to provide the authorities and/or 
the public with reliable information about its real possibilities to undertake 
restructuring and cost reductions activities. Its real interest lies in inducing both the 
authorities and the public to believe that its costs are high. Then, there is no 
significant way to adjust costs and production. Therefore, prices and tariffs must be 
maintained at high levels to ensure enough investments, to keep the quality of the 
services and to avoid supply shortages.  
The lack of information about the real situation of the strategic electricity 
group (E) is modelled through the action of a new player, (0), hazard, whose 
probability distribution captures the authorities’ uncertainty about the actual 
adjustment possibilities the strategic group E really has. 
The payment structure of the game reflects the fact that (consumers and the 
economy as a whole) benefit a lot from the adjustment and reduction of electricity 
prices and tariffs. However, once the authorities start the liberalisation process, the 
effectiveness of flexible regulation and price reductions depends upon a successful 
restructuring of the electricity strategic group. Electricity companies hold an 
important strategic informational advantage and they are in a good position to 
exploit it as they are a highly organized and effective pressure group interested in 
keeping a comfortable monopolistic position.  
The analysis of the game through retrospective induction lead us to a sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium, that is, an equilibrium based only upon credible 
threats. The key matter is to be found in the final sub game where regulatory 
authorities must decide whether to confirm the tariffs reduction or to go back 
maintaining the initial tariff level. They do not know what real adjustment 
possibilities the E group has and the risk to generate shortages and supplies troubles 
lead the regulatory authorities to stop tariff reductions returning to initial situation. 
Maintenance is the authority’s best replay for a wide range of probabilities. 
Other players and the electricity companies can analyse the game and they 
are able to anticipate the authorities’ best reply. Therefore, they are not interested in 
undertake a cost and price reduction policy, even if they have enough margin to get 
it, because they know that doing so they would reveal information to the regulatory 
authorities who will confirm the tariff reduction process. As a consequence the most 
likely result is that electricity companies refuse to undertake the restructuring and 
adjustment policies and the government will be driven to stop the tariff reduction 
process. 
How is it possible to face this problem? It seems clear that only a credible 
liberalisation and competition in a flexible regulation framework can accomplish 
such a challenge. If the reform and the liberalisation are associated with a clear 
commitment and a policy framework favourable to freedom of entry in the 
electricity sector, the threat and the possibility of entry of new enterprises changes 
the nature of the game and reduces the strategic influence and power of the 
152 
 
European Research Studies,  Volume XV, Issue 4, Special Issue on Energy, 2012 
 
incumbent electricity companies. Potential entry of new competitors – namely, 
international groups – gives credibility to the liberalisation process and highly 
contributes to its success. 
Let us see how the game structure changes with a believable commitment 
for entry freedom reducing the informational strategic advantage of incumbent 
electricity companies. The new game tree is now showed in the next Figure, where a 
new player appears to model the potential competitor, (PC), who has a real 
possibility to enter the national electricity market if the incumbent strategic 
electricity group is not able to carry out a convenient restructuring and cost-price 
reduction to meet the requirements of liberalisation and tariff reduction process 
launched by the government. 
 
Figure 2. Tariffs and electricity sector adjustment with freedom of entry. 
 
 
 
In this new game it can be realized that the entry of potential competitors is 
highly improbable when the strategic electric group (E) is decided to undertake a 
cost-price restructuring to meet the liberalisation requirements and the tariff 
reduction process launched by the government. We are not going to consider the 
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details of this situation but it can be easily assumed that in most cases the reply from 
the incumbent electricity companies and the regulatory authorities can manage this 
situation very well. 
However, if the strategic electric group is unable to carry out the adjustment 
and restructuring, there are wide possibilities to entries of potential competitors. The 
play of the potential competitor (PC) is watched and known by the regulatory 
authorities providing a proof on the comparative efficiency of the domestic 
electricity strategic group. If the potential competitor does not enter the market it can 
be supposed there is not enough profitability appeal and the best reply from 
regulation authorities is to stop the tariff reduction process. 
On the contrary, if the potential competitor plays in order to enter the 
market, it becomes evident both of an important margin to improve the comparative 
efficiency of the sector and a step further in the tariff reduction process. The best 
reply from authorities is to go ahead with the tariff lowering process. The public and 
the economy as a whole benefit from improved efficiency and reduced tariffs, but 
the most inefficient enterprises in the incumbent strategic group must suffer the 
costs and losses of being retired from the market. 
How likely is this kind of game? What does it really mean? The incumbent 
strategic electricity group (E) is perfectly able to anticipate these situations by means 
of analysing the sub games in the last stages, its best reply is to undertake enough 
restructuring efforts to improve its comparative efficiency and successfully meet the 
cost-price reduction requirements of the process. The analysis of the sub game 
perfect equilibria shows that a strong commitment with the sector opening to 
potential competition and the liberalisation of the entry policy is a key factor for the 
credibility and effectiveness of a flexible regulation and tariff reduction process as 
well.  
Provided the freedom of entry to efficient foreign investors, the real point is 
that cutting production or lowering quality standards from national producers as a 
reaction to price or tariff reduction measures by government or regulatory 
authorities is not anymore the best reply if they are able to adjust either costs or 
margins. Government or regulatory authorities can observe applications from 
efficient foreign investors whenever incumbents claim tariff reduction is putting on 
risk future supplies and/or service standards. If regulatory authorities are committed 
to a credible free entry policy, they will be able to achieve optimal results in any 
case.  
There are three main equilibrium possibilities: 
 
1. Incumbents react to tariff reductions announcements 
claiming it will be impossible to meet enough investments 
and there are no applications from foreign investors, tariffs 
and price caps should not be further reduced.  
2. Incumbents are able to cope with tariff reduction process 
and meet demand quantities and standards, they are able to 
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reach efficiency levels comparable to new applicants, tariff 
reduction process must be fostered and there will be no 
entries of foreign competitors.  
3. Some national incumbents are not able to reach good 
enough efficiency levels, there are applications from more 
efficient foreign investors, price reductions must go ahead 
and the entry of new producers will allow considerable 
improvements in the sector.  
 
In most cases, credible commitment towards a clear free entry policy is the 
key factor for a successful liberalisation and flexible regulation in the electricity 
sector. Is there no credible free entry policy, the regulatory game equilibrium 
dramatically changes, and also cost and margins adjustments are the best reply of 
incumbents any more. Moreover, it will be really hard to obtain efficiency gains 
through any kind of regulatory reform. This is why a credible commitment to free 
entry is ever a highly advisable policy in flexible regulatory reforms of electricity 
sectors to increase the welfare of consumers and to improve the efficiency of the 
sector and of the economy as a whole.  
 
 
4.  Final Remarks 
 
The development of the game framework in the above paragraph allows us 
to state for a clear commitment to freedom of entry in the electricity market, 
reducing the informational strategic advantage of incumbents. We find that the 
sector opening to potential competitors and the liberalisation of entry are a key 
factor for credibility and effectiveness of flexible regulation and tariffs reduction as 
well.  If there is no credible free entry policy the regulatory game equilibrium 
dramatically change, cost and margins adjustments are not the best reply of 
incumbents anymore and it will be really hard to obtain efficiency gains through any 
kind of regulatory reform. This is why a credible commitment to free entry is always 
a highly advisable policy in flexible regulatory reforms of electricity sectors, in 
order to increase the welfare of consumers and to improve the efficiency of the 
sector and of the economy as a whole.  
However, free entry remains a very complex issue. First of all, the European 
Commission must change the way mergers and acquisitions are analysed. The 
perspective under which M&A are considered must be European, not merely 
national. Cross-country ownership, namely on close regional markets, must be a 
threat when these markets become fully integrated.  
It seems clear that the increasing complexity of the European Energy 
Market, namely its transmission system will probably require a strengthening of the 
monitoring and intervention capacity of European agencies in the next years. The 
system deals with 42 TSOs from 34 countries and the power system serves 525 
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million citizens, generates 828 GW and involves 305,000 km of transmission lines 
managed by the TSOs. 
The empowerment of the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER) is pivotal for successful market integration and for competition. 
Therefore, the final compromise on ACER almost as an advisory role - to TSOs, 
national regulatory boards, the European Commission, the European Council and the 
EU Parliament   - may become a strategic error. 
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